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Abstract: 
 
This paper analyzes both global and regional approaches to solving problems of energy 
security and ecological imbalance by addressing specifically the problems of China’s 
energy security. PRC’s growing energy dependence has become a major concern for both 
economic and national security policymakers in that country. The ambitious goal of 
modernization of the economy along the lines of the other newly industrialized 
economies(NIEs) of Asia has succeeded only too well, and it is difficult to reorient 
economic priorities. If examined rigorously, such an economic strategic assumption can 
be seen to entail the goal of creating further technological capabilities. In particular, 
China seems to be firmly committed to the creation of a largely self-sustaining innovation 
system as part of a knowledge-based economy of the future . Such innovation systems, 
called positive feedback loop innovation systems or POLIS have been created by 
advanced countries, and NIEs such as South Korea and Taiwan are proceeding to create 
these as well. But this will add to its energy burden and further dependence on the US as 
the power which controls the key sea lanes. Only a strategic reorientation to building a 
self-sustaining POLIS  and appropriate regional cooperation institutions can lead to the 
way out of the current dilemma for China.     3
 
 




This paper analyzes both global and regional approaches to solving problems of energy 
security and ecological imbalance by addressing specifically the problems of China’s 
energy security. PRC’s growing energy dependence has become a major concern for both 
economic and national security policymakers in that country. The ambitious goal of 
modernization of the economy along the lines of the other newly industrialized 
economies(NIEs) of Asia has succeeded only too well, and it is difficult to reorient 
economic priorities. China’s  remarkable growth during the last twenty five years has led 
to a rapid increasae in energy demand, and its hunger for energy is apparently insatiable. 
There are of course both economic  and ecological aspects of this insatiable  demand for 
energy. There are also security issues that exercise the Chinese leadership increasingly. 
In this paper I examine the measures that China is taking to achieve energy security and 
the motivations behind these measures. I also look at China's investment in overseas oil 
exploration and development projects, interest in transnational oil pipelines, plans for a 
strategic petroleum reserve, expansion of refineries to process crude supplies from the 
Middle East, development of the natural gas industry, and gradual opening of onshore 
drilling areas to foreign oil companies. The key question is: can China hope to achieve 
both equitable growth and energy security  over the next two decades? I suggest the kind 
of  mathematical modeling and political economy analysis that may be necessary to 
answer this two-pronged question rigorously. 
 
China faces at least two pressing sets of energy policy challenges. The first is a problem 
of short run efficiency and  therefore relates to the immediate need to improve 
management and coordination of the nation’s energy supply. During the last five years 
economic growth has been close to 8% per annum. At the same time, energy demand 
grew by about 15% annually while oil imports grew at 30% per year. In today’s China, 
electrical power shortages are widespread, and transport bottlenecks constrain the ability 
of the industry to move both coal and oil to where they are needed.  
There are also longer term  energy policy challenges.   These concern the continuing 
inability of China’s government to formulate a coherent energy policy which could 
provide the basis for the effective management of the energy sector and its environmental 
consequences for the next fifty years and beyond. In appendix 3 ( prepared by Mariko 





                                                 
1 This model has been developed by Professor Barry Hughes at GSIS, University of Denver.   4
China’s entry into the WTO has already had and in the future will have diverse 
consequences for its economy and energy. The best overall assessment from the Chinese 
perspective is that although the short run adjustment costs--- for example, the increase in 
unemployment in the agricultural sector--- may be high, the long run economic benefits 
from integration into the world trading system are likely to be considerable. In particular, 
it is assumed that the export-led growth will continue and will also lead to the 
modernization of the economy along the lines of the other newly industrialized 
economies(NIEs) of Asia. If examined rigorously, such an assumption can be seen to 
entail the goal of creating further technological capabilities. In particular, China seems to 
be firmly committed to the creation of a largely self-sustaining innovation system as part 
of a knowledge-based economy of the future (Simon,1996; Simon and Goldman,1989; 
Lu, 2000). Such innovation systems, called positive feedback loop innovation systems or 
POLIS(Khan, 1998; 2003; 2004a) have been created by advanced countries, and NIEs 
such as South Korea and Taiwan are proceeding to create these as well.
2 Can China do 
the same? And will China’s entry into the WTO help or hinder such efforts? While the 
answers here are not clear, it is reasonable to say that its WTO membership
3 will open the 
way towards diversification of energy import sources. However, I will argue that much 
depends on US-China bilateral relationship also. Furthermore, as I will show, the current 
strategy of indiscriminate growth only without regards to sustainability or equity will 
make China’s growth is deeply problematic even in an open economy context of rules-
based trading in the WTO framework.  
 
 
In what follows, I will begin by identifying the most important aspects of the energy 
demand and supply aspects in order to ascertain China’s energy dependence. This will 
enable us to look at both economic welfare and sustainability issues as well as security 
issues which are discussed in section 3. In conclusion I draw attention to the real dilemma 
faced by the ambitious Chinese leaders and suggest that multilateralism and regional 
cooperation are the best strategic responses available to China. 
 
 
2. China’s energy dilemma: demand, supply and distributional issues 
 
 
China is now the world’s second largest consumer of energy, accounting for some 12% 
of global energy demand, but its rate of increase of demand is some four to five times that 
                                                 
2 A formal and complete description of POLIS as an innovation system ,and contrasts with NIS(national 
innovation system) of which POLIS is both an extension and an extended critique, is outside the scope of 
this paper. Khan (2004a) gives a formal description and two existence theorems in topological spaces. 
Technically, non-linearities and multiple equilibria are at the heart of a formal proof of POLIS and its 
properties. Khan (2003) presents both  a conceptual and concrete critique of NIS by comparing and 
contrasting the national innovation system ( NIS) with POLIS in the context of Taiwan. 
3 For welfare aspects of China’s entry into WTO see Khan, Haider A., "China's Entry into the WTO: ICT 
Sectors, Innovation, Growth and Distribution", July (2002b) - (Website address: 
http://www.e.utokyo.ac.jp/cirje/index.htm)  
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for the rest of the world. So what happens in China’s energy sector will affect the rest of 
the world as well. Table 1 below gives a picture of China’s actual and projected energy 
consumption till the year 2015.  
China’s energy sector displays continuing dependence on coal. China is the world’s 
largest consumer of coal, accounting for more than 30% of global coal consumption. 
Further, coal provides approximately 64% of China’s primary energy demand. While 
such dependence on coal is not necessarily a huge problem, it has two  unfortunate 
consequences. Use of coal is characterized by low energy efficiency and pollution.  
The  intrinsic energy value of a unit weight of coal is known to be less than that for oil 
and gas.The recovery rates for many of China’s coal mines are also low, meaning that 
much of the country’s coal resource is left in the ground, never to be recovered. Table 1 
below  confirms this. Furthermore, the efficiency of appliances which use coal in China 
continues to be substantially lower than the average in OECD countries. Progress has 
been slow in enhancing the efficiency of consumer electrical appliances and 
implementing building codes which reduce heat losses. Finally, the continuing low level 






















From table 1 above it is clear that China’s energy consumption will be 4 times what it 
was in 1980 by the year 2015.The share of oil during the same period will be on the 
increase also.China shifted from being  net oil exporter to net oil importer in 1993.What 
explains the increasing dependence on oil? Table 2 below is an input-output 
decomposition of China’s energy use. Scrutinizing  table 2 below we can see that it is 
intimately related to final demand shift. Within the final demand shift, both household 
and investment needs are responsible for the lion’s share. Thus, China’s industrialization 
strategy and the increasing prosperity of households can explain its increasing 
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Table 2 




Although domestic production figures have not been projected till 2015 in table 3 above, 
simple extrapolation would show that import dependence is here to stay. Thus the 
conclusion that follows from the evidence presented in tables 1 and 2 seems to be that 
China’s  import dependence will be a policy problem for at least till 2025, if not for even 
a longer period. The vulnerability is great as shown in table 4. 
Table 4 
   9
Table 4 which is taken from the scenarios run by the EIA and the RAND corporation 
shows the effects on GDP when prices shift unfavorably affecting supply and production. 
In the appendix, I outline a model that looks at the distributional impacts of such 
disruptions in a linear approximation scenario. In particular, poverty impacts are derived. 
The preliminary results suggest strongly that almost all of Chinaa’s growth induced 
poverty reduction gains can be destroyed through disruptions in the energy markets alone. 
For China’s policy makers this must be a sobering thought. What options are available to 
them? In the next section, I review and assess the steps taken and suggest a strategy most 
likely to succeed. 
 
 
3. China’s energy dilemma: strategic moves 
 
 
China’s energy dilemma has renewed concerns about long term  energy security. Several 
decades ago, the same concerns existed but the solution was also clear and simple--- to 
increase domestic production. Our analysis indicates that this is no longer a viable 
option.
4 Discovery of large reserves is unlikely. Thus oil is seen as a source of 
vulnerability in Beijing. Since plans for building a POLIS depend crucially on oil, it 
could make China  vulnerable to foreign pressures. Many years of debate within the state 
council has not resolved this difficult problem. Policy makers have been divided over 
whether domestic production should be increased or explore for oil abroad. In practice 
both the paths are being followed. I will argue that neither is going to reduce vulnerability 
to a large extent soon. In the medium to long run, however, there is a third option 
available; but it will require both rethinking development priorities at home and 
reorienting diplomacy towards greater regional cooperation. But let us look at the 
existing divided strategy. 
 
The centerpiece of the current strategy seems to be an ambitious scheme of investment in 
overseas oil projects together with continuing domestic exploration. The state owned oil 
companies of China are the key players in both arenas.During the 1980s China launched 
three large oil companies. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation(CNOOC) has 
controlled most of the offshore oil businesses since its founding in 1982. The China 
National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) was founded in 1983 and is responsible 
for refining and marketing. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was 
founded in 1988 by the ministry of petroleum industry. In 1998 the government 
reorganized CNPC and Sinopec and created two vertically integrated oil 
companies.However, CNPC is still China’s dominant upstream oil company and Sinopec 
the main downstream company in the industry. 
 
Initially, the government maintained a two-tiered pricing policy that required CNPC to 
sell to its industrial customers at a fraction of the market price. The resulting cash flow 
constraint led to limited exploration. In 1993, the government relaxed the pricing policy 
increasing the first tier crude price. CNPC was the main beneficiary, as indeed was the 
                                                 
4 See also Christoffersen (1998) for an analysis of the situation particularly with respect to China’s relations 
with Russia and Central Asia in historical perspective.   10
intention. CNPC officials knew that unless the money was quickly invested it would be 
confiscated. The coincidental appointment of Zhou Yongkang who favored foreign 
investment led to overseas expansion of investment.
5 Since this time, views of top CNPC 
officials have mattered a great deal in China’s foreign energy investments. However, they 
are chosen ultimately by the Communist Party leadership. Hence it can be rightly said 
that the Party is the final arbiter. 
 
 
Among other things CNPC has invested from Canada to Kazakhstan. In 1997 it pledged 
over $8 billion for oil concessions in Canada, Venezuela, Iraq and the Sudan. Such 
activities underline the high priority attached to these projects. They can also lead to 
increasing tension between China and the US. For example, in 1997, CNPC acquired a 
sixty per cent stake in Kazakhstan’s Aktyubinskmunaigaz Production Association. CNPC 
beat out Texaco, Amoco and Russia’s Yujnimost by agreeing to pay $320 million bonus 
to the Kazakh government and to conduct a feasibility study on the construction of an 
1800 mile pipeline to Western China. This was estimated to cost $ 3.5 billion.In 
September 1997, CNPC followed similar tactics to defeat Petronas, Unocal and Amoco to 
win a controlling interest in Uzen, Kazakhstan’s second largest oilfield with reserves of 
1.5 bb.  
 
In June 1997, a consortium of Chinese oil companies signed a 22-year production sharing 
contract with Iraq to develop half of the Al-Ahdab field after thhe lifting of UN sanctions. 
Al-Ahdab is the country’s second largest oilfield.Prior to the US invasion of Iraq, CNPC 
was negotiating for rights to develop three other Iraqi fields. These are Halfaya, Luhais 
and Suba. 
 
However, the US invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation has put these plans in 
great jeopardy.The global energy situation is now marked by even more uncertainty and 
the Chinese must feel more vulnerable than ever. It is always possible that US 
imperialism will fail like all imperialist powers to ultimately control the middle eastern 
oil or even the sea routes permanently. But the realists in China must know that the 
current situation is one of US dominance. Apart from its domestic snafus reflected in the 
facts such as that Kazakhstan-China pipeline plans were shelved in 1999, the US 
preeminence as a military power and its willingness to use this power for various 
purposes including protecting control over overseas oil, China’s energy dependence 
seems logically to lead to dependence on the US hegemony. What is the way out? I 
suggest that rethinking development strategy and increasing regional cooperation offer 
the best hope for China. 
 
Strategically, Chinese development path has been so far marked by the East Asian 
model.According to this model heavy state involvement together with the promotion of 
market led industrialization through export promotion is the best strategy for 
development. As an industrialization strategy, this can succeed up to a point. However, as 
                                                 
5 For a detailed description see, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg . 1998. Policy Making in China: 
Leaders, Structures, and Processes , Princeton: , Princeton University Press. 
   11
the Asian financial crisis demonstrated, there are risks as well (Khan1997, 1998, 2004 a 
and b).The Chinese strategy has led to high growth and a lopsided distribution together 
with energy dependence. Following this path further without qualification, as the current 
leadership seems to have grasped, will exacerbate the negative aspects with the inevitable 
growth  slowdown. However, there is an alternative which I have developed in detail 
elsewhere. Here I will merely sketch the main outline. 
 
In my development of an alternative strategy(Khan 1983, 1982a and b, 1997,1998, 2002, 
2003, 2004 a and b; Khan and Sonko 1994) based among others on an extension of  
Schumpeterian theory of innovation and Sen’s capabilities, the key is a distributionally 
sensitive approach with clear recognition of ecological constraints.The main idea is to 
moderate the growth rate and hence short term dependence on fossil fuels and minimize 
consequent ecological problems.With a proper poverty reduction strategy---called 
‘growth plus’strategy
6--- the adverse distributional consequences from moderate growth 
can be avoided. In fact, with a properly moderate ‘growth plus’strategy, the capabilities 
of the great majority of the poulation caan be enhanced along with the productive 
capacity. This will lead to the creation of a domestic market for commodities that are 
produced in a much more ecologically sustainable manner. Furthermore, the goal of a 
transition to a relatively non-fossil fuel based knowledge and information economy will 
be facilitated and the transition will occur more quickly and smoothly under the proposed 
POLIS strategy. 
 
The question of domestic market creation leads also to considerations of cooperation in 
Asia. For reasons of regional financial stability, reciprocal exporting and  energy security 
greater cooperation in each of these spheres is an urgent necessity. China along with the 
other countries in Northeast Asia must proceed to diffuse tensions and build up regional 
institutions. Given the historic hostilities this will be no easy task. Yet the enlightened 
self-interests of the countries together with imperatives of regional peace and prosperity 
lead logically towards cooperation. There is much here to learn from European 
integration experience, particularly about the role of enlightened leadership. No doubt, 
there are special Asian features and special Asian roadblocks that might require particular 
Asian approaches to negotiation and conflict resolution at times. But China’s energy 
dilemma is one compelling reason for that country to take the initiative and start a 
dialogue. There is no time to lose. 
 
4. Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
In this paper I have sketched the energy dilemma for China in this century. As long as the 
current geopolitical situation persists the pursuit of present development strategy of 
China will further increase its energy dependence. For both political and economic 
reasons China needs to rethink its development strategy. I have sketched such an 
alternative strategy that relies much less on fossil fuels and emphasizes regional 
cooperation. This POLIS strategy will ultimately lead to a sustainable economy based on 
growth with equity. A transition to a non- fossil fuel based knowledge and information 
economy will also be easier to effect under the proposed strategy.  
                                                 
6 This is discussed in detail in chapter 1 of Khan and Weiss, forthcoming.   12
 
However, time is of the essence. Given the path dependence of development unless 
strategic disengagement from the existing path followed by a strategic engagement with 
the alternative strategy is begun within the next five years, it may well be too late. The 
stakes are indeed very high. A  more detailed strategy paper based on the key ideas from 
the alternative strategy outlined here with concrete quantitative scenarios and feasibility 
studies along the lines of models sketched in the appendix ( and other, more detailed 
models) will go some distance towards  giving the appropriate analytical foundations for 
the policy makers. The preliminary results confirm the predictions regarding fossil fuel-
based energy shortage and lead towards a serious consideration of alternative energy 
sources. Achieving the twin goals of energy security and ecological balance are 
challenging but not impossible for China. Serious policy research can be used effectively 
if there is the political will to do so. The goal of regional cooperation is also achievable if 




Appendix 1: Growth Impacts of the energy sectors--- A simple SAM-based Model 
 
Fixed Price Modeling in a SAM-based Framework: 
  In this section the Social Accounting Matrix is presented as a data gathering 
framework as well as an analytical tool for studying the effects the energy sectors on 
growth. Appendix two presents the methodology for estimating the impact of growth 
generated by the energy sectors on poverty alleviation.  The origins of social accounting 
can be traced as far back as Gregory King’s efforts in 1681, but more recent work stems 
from the attempts by Richard Stone, Graham Pyatt, Erik Thorkbecke and others. 
7 
In the methodological framework of this study the SAM is used for mapping 
production and distribution at the economy wide level.  In this section, first a general 
SAM is described.  Then it is shown how the method for studying the effect of growth 
within this framework follows logically from its structure.  The model used is a simple 
version of a class of SAM-based general equilibrium models.
8  It summarizes succinctly 
the interdependence between productive activities, factor shares, household income 
distribution, balance of payments, capital accounts, etc. for the economy as a whole at a 
point in time.  Given the technical conditions of production the value added is distributed 
to the factors in a determinate fashion.  The value added accrued by the factors is further 
received by households according to their ownership of assets and the prevailing wage 
structure.  In the matrix form the SAM consists of rows and columns representing 
receipts and expenditures, respectively.  As an accounting constraint receipts must equal 
expenditures. 
  As is elaborated further in Khan and Thorbecke (1988), the SAM framework can 
be used to depict a set of linear relationships in a fixed coefficient model.  For deciding 
the question of determination, the accounts need to be divided into exogenous and 
endogenous ones.  For instance, in the China SAM, there are three endogenous accounts.  
These are factors, households and production activities, leaving the government, capital 
and the rest of the world accounts as exogenous.
9 
                                                 
7 For a description of SAM as a data gathering device, see G. Pyatt and E. Thorbecke, Planning Techniques 
for a Better Future (Geneva:  ILO, 1976). Khan(1997) also has a chapter on this alone. 
8In Walrasian general equilibrium models the flexible price vector determines the equilibrium.  In a 
Keynesian (dis)equilibrium model in the short-run the quantities vary while the price vector remains fixed. 
9 See Khan and Thorbecke, op.cit., Ch. II for more theoretical details and empirical examples.  The 
presentations here follow the cited work closely.     14
 
 
Table 1: Simplified Schematic Social Accounting Matrix  
 
                                          
          E x p e n d i t u r e s      
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  Looking at Table 2, which represents a SAM, we can see immediately that 
y = n + x     (1) 
y = 1 + t     (2)   15
Now if we divide the entries in the matrix Tnn by the corresponding total income (i.e. yn), 
we can define a corresponding matrix of average expenditure propensities.  Let us call 
this matrix A.  We now have: 
y = n + x = Ay + x   (3) 
y = (1-A)
-1x = Mx   (4) 
M has been called the matrix of accounting multipliers by Thorbecke, for these 
multipliers, when computed, can account for the results (e.g. income, consumption, etc.) 
obtained in the SAM without explaining the process that led to them.  Let us now 
partition the matrix A in the following way.
10 
                                                 
10 Ibid.   16
 
  ⎡0   0   A13  ⎤ 
  ⎜               ⎥ 
A=  ⎜A21   A 22    0     ⎥   (5) 
  ⎜                ⎥ 
  ⎣0   A32   A 33  ⎦ 
 
Table 2: Schematic Representation of Endogenous and Exogenous Accounts in a SAM  
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Source: H.A. Khan and E. Thornbecke, Choice and Diffusion of Technology in a 
Macroeconomic (SAM)   Framework 
 
 
Given the accounts factors, household and the production activities, now we see that the 
income levels of these accounts (call them y1, y2, y3 respectively) are determined as 
functions of the exogenous demand of all other accounts.  In this respect, what we have is 
a reduced-form model which can be consistent with a number of structural forms.  This is 
quite satisfactory as far as tracing the effects of a certain injection in the economy is 
concerned or for prediction purposes when the structural coefficients are more or less 
unchanged. 
  One limitation of the accounting multiplier matrix M as derived in equation (2.2) 
is that it implies unitary expenditure elasticities (the prevailing average expenditure 
propensities in A are assumed to apply to any incremental injection).  A more realistic 
alternative is to specify a matrix of marginal expenditure propensities (Cn below) 
corresponding to the observed income and expenditure elasticities of the different agents, 
under the assumption that prices remain fixed.  The Cn matrix can be partitioned in the 
same way as the A matrix above.  The most important difference between the two   17
partitioned  matrix is that C32 ≠ A32.  Expressing the changes in income (dy) resulting 
from changes in injections (dx), one obtains,  
dyn = Cndyn + dx    (6) 
      = (I - Cn)
-1 dx = Mcdx (7) 
Mc has been called a fixed price multiplier matrix and its advantage is that it allows any 
nonnegative income and expenditure elasticities to be reflected in Mc.  In particular, in 
exploring the macroeconomic effects of exogenous changes in the output of different 
product-cum-technologies on other macroeconomic variables, it would be very unrealistic 
to assume that consumers react to any given proportional change in their incomes by 
increasing expenditures on the different commodities by exactly that same proportion 
(i.e. assuming that the income elasticities of demand of the various socioeconomic 
household groups for the various commodities were all unity).  Since the expenditure 
(income) elasticity is equal to the ratio of the marginal expenditure propensity (MEPi) to 
the average expenditure propensity (AEPi) for any given good i, it follows that the 
marginal expenditure propensity can be readily obtained once the expenditure elasticity 
and the average expenditure propensities are known, i.e.,  
yi = MEPi/AEPi    (8) 
MEPi = yi AEPi   (9) 
and ΣMEPi = 1    (10) 
       i 
 
Thus, given the matrix A32 of average expenditure propensities, and the corresponding 
expenditure elasticities of demand, yi the corresponding marginal expenditure 




                                                 
11See Khan and Thorbecke (1988) for some examples.  
See also G. Pyatt and J.I. Round, “Accounting and Fixed Price Multipliers in Social Acounting Matrix 
Framework,” Economic Journal Vol. 89, Dec. 1979, p. 861.   18
 
    
Appendix 2: Energy Sectors, Growth, Distribution and Poverty. 
Multiplier Decomposition,Growth and Poverty Alleviation Sensitivity 
  Since poverty in the present context is measured by identifying a poverty line in 
monetary terms incomes of the various household groups are the crucial variables.  In 
particular, sectoral growth generated by the energy sectors must be linked to incomes of 
the various households in order to determine the exact extent of the alleviation of poverty 
through growth.  The exact effect of income growth on poverty, of course, depends on the 
sensitivity of the adopted poverty measure to income.  In this paper the Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984) Pα class of additively decomposable poverty measure is selected for 
this purpose.  For α=0,1,n this measure becomes the headcount ratio, the poverty gap and 
a distributionally sensitive measure that gives specific weights to each poor person’s 
shortfall, respectively.   
  If we apply Kakwani’s (1993) decomposition to the Pα measure for specific  
sectors and households i and j respectively, the change in Pαij can be written as follows: 
                    
    dPαij  =   ∂Pαij  +     Σ  ∂Pαij   d θijk       (11) 
         ∂yi            
k=1
      ∂θijk                       
 
Here Pαij is the FGT Pα measure connecting sector j to household group i, yi is the mean 
per-capita income of household group i,  and θ ijk is the income distribution parameter.  
Under the unrealistic but simplifying assumption of distributional neutrality: 
d Pαij = ηαi⎛dyi⎞  (12) 
     Pαij              ⎝yi ⎠  
 
where ηαi  is the elasticity of Pij with respect to the mean per capita income of each 
household group i resulting from an increase in the output of sector j.  dyi on the right 
hand side is the change in mean per capita income of household group i.  This can be 
written as (by considering the fixed price multiplier matrix) 
 dyc = mij dxj   (13) 
 where  dxj is the change in the output of sector j on a per capita basis for group j. 
We can now rewrite the aηverage change in poverty measure as 
 d  Pαij= ηαimij  ⎛dxj⎞ (14) 
              Pαij               ⎝yi  ⎠ 
 
By aggregating across the household groups we can arrive at the overall poverty 
alleviation effect 
             
                        m                                         m 
d Pαj    Σ   ⎛dPαij⎞  ⎛ni⎞     Σ   ⎛dPαij⎞  ⎛Pαij⎞   (15) 
               Pαj = 
i=1   ⎝Pαij ⎠   ⎝n ⎠ =  
i=1   ⎝Pαij   ⎠  ⎝Pαj ⎠ 
Since we are considering a Pα measure  
           m 
dPαj = Σ    ⎛dPαij ⎞ ⎛Σ(z-yk)/z)
α ⎞   (16)   19
  Pαj       i=1     ⎝Pαij  ⎠  ⎝Σ(z-yl)/z)
α ⎠ 
 
                                                                                                                          m 
where qi is the number of poor in the ith group and the total number of poor q=Σqi 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
i=1
 
                                                                                               m 
Let sαi be the poverty share of household group i (naturally Σ sαi = 1) 
                                                                                               
i=1 
        qi                  q 
sαi = Σ⎛z-yk⎞
α  Σ   ⎛z-yl ⎞
α   (17)
 
           k=1⎝  z ⎠     
l=1    ⎝ z   ⎠
 
 
We can further rewrite the expression for the average change in overall poverty 
alleviation. 
           m 
dPαj = Σ ⎛dPαji⎞ sαi   (18)
 
 Pαj      
i=1  ⎝Pαij  ⎠
 
Combining equations 14 and 18 
we now have, 
dPαj = Σsαiηαi mij ⎛dxj ⎞   (19) 
 Pαj                                 ⎝ yi   ⎠ 
 
 
  Thorbecke and Jung(1996) separate the income increase via the modified 
multiplier effect from the sensitivity of the poverty measure formally in equation (19) by 
defining the following two entities:   
1.   m
/
αij = sαimij gives the modified multiplier effect in terms of income of a poor group. 
2.   qαij = ηαi(dxj/yi) represents the sensitivity of the poverty index to the change in 
income.  I adopt their terminology and call this the poverty sensitivity effect. 
But each multiplier mij can be further decomposed: 
mij=ηjdij     (20) 
where nj gives the (closed loop) interdependency effects and dij the distributional effects 
of a change in demand for the product of sector j on household group i. 
Thus, 
                m 
dPαj/Pαj = Σm
/
αijqαij   (21) 
    m 
= Σ(rαij) (sαijdij)(qαij)   (22) 
    
i 
The dij on the right hand side can be further decomposed by multiplicatively 
decomposing the total distributive effects. Given the structure of Cn matrix in section 2. 
D=D3D2D1 where D3= (I-C22)
-1; D2=C21C13, and D1=(I-C33) 
-1 
The particular element for each household i and sector j can be selected from these three 
matrices.   
  Thus the contribution of an increase in output of a particular sector j to poverty 
alleviation can be decomposed multiplicatively into its two components:  (i) the   20
contribution due to the change in mean income of the poor across all groups and (ii) the 




Appendix 3: China’s Energy Future 






The question of how China will fuel its growing energy demand ranks as one the 
most important current issues concerning the government of China.  Will China continue 
its reliance on fossil fuels?  Will it instead increase investment and expand renewable 
resources?  Or will it expand both fossil fuel and renewable energy usage? This paper is 
an attempt to answer these questions by examining the factors driving government energy 
policies, and analyzing the implications.  Section 1 will discuss the main factors driving 
governmental policies; the environment, China’s growing economy, and concerns over 
dependency on foreign oil.  Section 2 will then examine the governmental policies 
concerning renewable energy, sources of renewable energy, and challenges facing 
renewable energy implementation.  Similarly, Section 3 will examine the governmental 
policies concerning fossil fuels and sources of fossil fuel energy.  Finally, Section 4 will 
present two different energy scenarios; the renewable energy scenario in which all 
driving factors are conducive to renewable energy expansion, and the fossil fuel scenario, 
in which the driving factors are not conducive to renewable energy expansion.  These 
scenarios will also attempt to incorporate both the major and minor factors driving 
China’s future energy plans, for both supply and demand.    
 
1.  Main Drivers Behind China’s Energy Policies 
 
Three main factors are driving China’s energy policies; the environment, growing 
economy, and dependency on foreign oil.  Concerns over environmental degradation are 
driving China to adopt environmentally friendly energy policies; placing an increasing 
emphasis on the importance of renewable resources.  China’s growing economy is 
driving an expansion for both renewable energy and fossil fuels.  Concerns over 
dependency on foreign oil are leading Chinese policy makers to implement renewable 
energy policies. Yet simultaneously, China’s growing economy is forcing the government 
to seek oil resources on an international scale. 
 
   21
 
  
China’s Growing Economy and the Increasing Demand of Energy Supplies as a 
Fundamental Drive in Energy Policies: 
 
By mid-century China has strong potential to rank as the world’s second largest 
economy.  From 1971 to 1995, China’s economic growth rate has averaged 8.5 percent 
annually, and is estimated to continue to grow at 5.6 percent from 1995 to 2020, if Hong 
Kong is included.  China’s economic growth, coupled with a massive population, is 
placing increasing strains on energy resources.  Economic expansion of this magnitude 
entails a domestic energy demand that is predicted to grow at a rate more than any other 
nation; indeed, this economic growth has been accompanied with an energy consumption 
growth averaging 5 percent per year.  After the U.S., China is the second largest energy 
consuming economy in the world.  In 1997, China expended 9.6 percent of the of the 
global energy consumption.  By 2020, it is forecasted to grow to16.1 percent.
1   
  
Increased energy usage is inevitable due to China’s rapid development.  As China 
develops, structural changes within the economy are bringing about an irreversible 
increase in energy demand.  Low intensive agricultural production is being replaced by 
higher energy-intensive manufacturing and social services.  Traditional labor-intensive 
agricultural production will depend on higher mechanization, bringing about a greater 
demand for petroleum products.  In the automobile sector, increasing production and 
passenger usage are predicted to grow.  In 2002, automobile production was 50 percent 
higher than in 2001.  One scholar has noted the “possibility of up to 250 million cars in 
China by 2050”- a potential for China to become the worlds number one car market.
2 
Securing adequate energy supplies for sustaining China’s economic development is hence 
a prominent driving force behind China’s energy policies.      
  
Environmental Pollution as a Driving Concern in China’s Energy Policies 
  
Environmental pollution related to China’s current energy usage has created 
serious concern both at the domestic and international level.  Domestically, the 
environmental harm done by China’s energy sector is severe through much of the country.  
Pollution and its impact span across all sectors of the environment, from indoor air 
pollution to urban air pollution, to acid rain and consequent crop/forest destruction.
3 
Governmental Policies     
Environment  Growing Economy   Dependency on Foreign Oil 
Renewable Resources  Fossil Fuels 
                   Main Drivers   22
Seven of the world’s most polluted cities are located in China.  Urban air pollution in 
most cities exceeds international standards by a factor of 3 to 5 times.  Such sober 
excesses of pollution are reflected in numerous related illnesses; chronic respiratory 
disease, cancer, premature illness and death. The effects of pollution pervade the 
agricultural system as well; acid rain is increasingly serious, particularly in southern 
China.
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A study estimated, “China could eliminate its need to import grain if the haze and soot 
over grain producing areas was reduced.  Researchers believe that haze may be 
depressing China’s farm yields by 5 to 30 percent.”
5 As a consequence, crop damage is 
estimated to approach two percent of the entire country’s gross domestic product.
6 Other 
estimates are less generous. The World Bank estimates air and water pollution in 1995 
resulted in a loss of about $50 billion, or 8% of the GDP.   
  
The environmental impacts of China’s energy policies are also globally felt.   
Second only to the U.S., China is of the world’s major contributors to global climate 
change and ozone depletion.
7 Air pollution from China has also been a source of 
increasing concern to its close neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region.  Countries such as 
South Korea and Japan have complained publicly of the effect of China’s air pollution on 
their own nations for over a decade.
8 Finally, greenhouse emissions are expected to rise; 
the International Agency in Paris predicts that the increase in emissions will increase 
from 2000 to 2030 until ‘China alone could nearly equal the increase from the entire 
industrialized world.’
9 Environmental studies increasingly realize the magnitude of 
China’s role in sustaining a healthy eco-system; issues which concern China domestically 
also impact the ecosystem of the world as a whole.   
 
  China’s coal-based economy and its carbon emissions are the primary source for 
the excessive pollution problems currently challenging the country.   China is the second 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases after the U.S., largely due to its coal burning.
10 Three 
quarters of the electricity generated in 
China is based on coal energy 
consumption.  In the years 1990-1996, 
China’s CO2 emissions accounted for over 
90 percent of the increases in the world.  
In 1998, China emitted 740.38 million 
metric tons of carbon.
11 Further, indoor 
use of coal or firewood for domestic 
purposes is reportedly still practiced by 78 
percent of the population, claiming 1.46   23
million lives in 1995 due to respiratory disease.
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Increasing Dependency on Foreign Oil as a Driving Factor in China’s 
Energy Concerns 
  
  As China attempts to secure energy resources for its growing economy of less 
severe polluting potential than coal based consumption, it is increasingly pushed towards 
dependency on foreign oil.  Throughout the 1970s China’s oil export had increased 
steadily but peaked in the mid 1980s.
13 In response to dwindling domestic supplies, 
China became a net oil importer in 1993 and foreign oil dependency has been growing 
ever since.
14   In 1999, 22 percent of the total oil consumption came from imported oil. 
Most studies concur that China’s foreign oil dependency is likely to increase as China’s 
oil imports are increasing years, almost doubling during 2000 alone.
15 According to one 
study, the net imported oil will reach 40 percent by 2010.
16 Another study states 
“dependence on foreign petroleum sources, more than 368 million bbl in 2000, will also 
increase, probably doubling to more than 735 million bbl by 2020, which will form 
approximately 50 percent of China’s total petroleum consumption.”
17 The growing 
disparity in China’s production and consumption of oil are displayed in Figure 5.  
Furthermore, upon China’s entry into the WTO, tariff reductions on imported refined oil 
decreased from the current 69 percent to 6 percent and import quotas for petroleum 
products have also increased by 15 percent.  Such new tariff regulations have led to oil 




To secure enough oil imports to satisfy the 
energy needs of a growing economy, 
China is establishing energy relationships 
all across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, 
Russia, Central Asia, and Latin America.
19 
with the majority coming from the Middle 
East and Southwest Asia.    
   24
However, such increasing dependency on foreign oil imports has led to the  
 
 
13Gan, Lin, Energy Development and Environmental Constraints in China (Oslo: Center for International Climate and Environmental 
Research 1997) 5  
14Ibid. 5 
15Cole, Bernard 51 
16Zhengming 4  
17Cole, Bernard 15 
18Cole, Bernard 54                
 
19Gan, Lin 16 
 
 
growing concern of Chinese officials over the future security of an energy resource so 
vital to China’s economic growth.  Several issues in particular are troubling policy 
makers.  Will China become more vulnerable to the uncertainty of the oil markets?  How 
plausible is continued petroleum reliance considering the increase in the price of crude oil 
and dwindling world supplies?  What about political volatility?  A senior state Council 
economist is claimed to have noted that ‘American military campaigns in Afghanistan 
and possible campaigns in Southwest Asia will greatly affect China’s oil strategy in the 
Middle East and Central Asian countries.’
20 In face of such issues, foreign dependency on 
oil has become a significant issue of concern driving China’s energy policies.  
 
2.  Renewable Energy:  Governmental Policies, Sources of Renewable Energy, and 
Challenges 
 
In response to the aforementioned key drivers, environment, growing economy, and 
dependency on foreign oil, China has adopted renewable energy polices that are 
remarkable for a developing country.  Governmental policies, renewable energy 
resources, and the challenges to renewable energy usage are discussed in this section 
of the paper. 
 
Governmental Policies Concerning Renewable Energy 
 
The “White Paper on China’s Population, Environment, and Development in the 
Twenty-First Century” outlays China’s first significant policy framework for the 
development of renewable energy resources.  The plan was approved on March 25, 1994, 
and was the original economic and social development of renewable energy framework 
for the years 1996-2010.  The objectives of the plan were to ‘raise the conversion 
efficiency of renewable energy, lower production costs, and enlarge the contribution of 
renewables to the energy system.’
21 In addition, the plan sought to create a modern 
industrial base and market infrastructure for already developed renewables, and fund 
research and demonstration projects for necessary technological advances.  In particular, 
the plan aimed for the following increases in renewable energy usage:  the construction of 
1,000 MW of large scale windfarms by 2,000 MW and 3,000 MW, improved efficiency 
and reduction of systems cost for development of low cost solar cells other equipment, 
higher exploitation of geothermal energy, and 300 MW by 2010 for biomass.  Under such 
a plan, China’s renewable energy would have increased from insignificant to 1.3 by 2020. 
Progress was slightly better than predicted, by 2003 renewable energy consumption   25
accounted for 3 percent of the country’s total energy consumption.
22 Progressive, true, 
but hardly a dent in China’s energy needs.   
 
However, driven by the aforementioned factors, China has recently adopted a 
substantially more progressive stance towards renewable energy.  In February 2005, 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) endorsed the Renewable 
Energy Law on February.  The law aims to boost China’s renewable energy capacity up  




to 15% by the year 2020, and plans to invest $180 billion in this period.  The law contains 
significant structural changes worth mentioning.  First, it requires grid operators to 
purchase resources from registered renewable energy producers.  Second, the cost of 
purchasing this power will be spread across all customers on the grid.  Hence, a former 
major obstacle of high consumer cost will be mitigated.  The law also provides financial 
subsidies, tax incentives, low cost loans, and tax breaks for renewable energy resource 
development and projects.  
 
In regards to specific renewable resource development, the law ‘encourages’ the 
following developments.   
o  Clean and efficient development of biological fuel and development of 
energy crops 
o  Installation of solar energy system in work places and individual 
consumption, like water heating systems, solar voltaic systems, etc 
o  Real estate development enterprises are to provide necessary conditions 
for such installations 
o  Utilization of renewable energy in rural areas 
 
Finally, the government pledges to support scientific and technological research and to 
help with the production of renewable energy in remote areas.
23 
 




  China has historically harnessed wind power for a variety of tasks; pumping water, 
threshing grain, powering boats, are a few examples.  As a country having world- class 
wind energy potential, modern technology has focused on utilizing wind power to 
generate electricity.  According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, ‘the 
theoretical wind energy potential in China is estimated at 3,226 GW at a 10 meter hub 
height, and the practical wind energy potential is estimated at 253 GW. By the end of 
2003, 567 MW of grid-connected wind turbines were installed and more than 160,000 
small wind turbines for rural electrification were installed.’
24 Thus, wind power has 
strong potential as a renewable energy resource. 
 
Biomass   26
 
  Biomass energy plays an important role in China’s energy consumption.  It 
supplies up to 70 percent of China’s domestic energy consumption in the rural areas, 
(ping 4) though it does not contribute significantly to economic energy concerns.  
Currently, the amount of used is approximately equal to oil consumption rates, and is 
obtained most from firewood, stalks, organic waste and gas.
25   
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  China has rich geothermal energy potential available from hot springs, tidal 
energy, ocean currents, wave energy and ocean thermal energy.
26 Currently there are 
1,100 places which are directly using the low temperature of geothermal energy for 
plantation, aquaculture, space heating, and health care.  In addition there are seven small 
experimental tidal power stations, and three wave power stations are under 
construction.




  China has a long tradition of research and development in the area of solar power 
technologies, beginning from the 1970s.  More than 40 companies and institutions are 
involved in photovoltaic research and development; presently most solar PV is used for 
microwave, communication systems, and remote homes.
28 Currently, China ranks as the 
number one user and manufacturer in solar water heaters.  Most solar energy is used for 
supplying heat and electricity in remote areas.  
 
  Challenges to the Greater Usage of Renewable Energy 
 
Policy/Market Related Challenges  
 
“With many renewable technologies, the scale of development has not been large 
enough to bring down the costs to a competitive level. For example, wind power- 
whose costs have come down remarkably in recent years- is still more expensive 
on a kWh basis than coal production.  However, if the wind industry received 
anything close to the level of government support that the state-owned coal mines 
have received, wind would certainly be competitive.”
29       
 
  Two fundamental issues impede the development of China’s relatively nascent 
renewable energy system; governmental policy and lack of a market for renewable 
energy.  To begin with, the electricity industry was developed as a monopoly under the 
centrally planned government of China.  As a result, the slow progress in the 
development of renewable energy is linked to government policies in support of 
traditional fossil fuel usage, or lack of coherent policies concerning renewable energy. 
For example, the Chinese national utility has indicated little interest in developing   27
renewable energy projects. Due to policy pricing, local distribution companies at the 
county or city level generally bear all the costs for renewable energy generation.  
However, all of the aforementioned may change if China reaches the goals state in the 
Renewable Energy Plan; in particular, Plan is supposed to spread the cost of purchasing 








Second, an independent, competitive market for renewable energy resources is 
also in an inchoate stage of development, keeping prices high for consumers and 
investors wary of perceived ‘high-risk’ in the renewable energy investments. Grid and 
non-grid connected energy resource generation suffers from the lack of a wholesale 
market and no independent industry to develop renewable resources. Because investors 
perceive projects as high risk, renewable energy generation suffers from a lack of capital, 





  Renewable energy sources are often more expensive than traditional fossil fuel 
based resources for a number of reasons.  For example, upfront costs of wind power 
development are more expensive than coal usage. One reason for the high cost is the need 
to import larger scale and more advanced technologies from developed countries in 
addition to value-added taxes, shipping and installation. The high capital costs of 
photovoltaics are common to any country.  In China, small production scale, outdated 
production facilities and techniques, and the necessary importation of technology such as 
silicon wafers contribute to high costs particularly for a low-income country.  Finally, 
costs of renewable energy sources are generally higher due to lack of government support 
and a competitive market.  Again, if the government succeeds in implementing the goals 
of the Renewable Energy Plan then it will provide financial subsides, tax incentives, low 






“The main barrier impeding landfill gas development is technical, appropriate 
practices for methane capture has never been used in China.  Lack of access to 
information on the technology and lack of experience with the design, 
construction, and operation of gas recovery plants are major problems.”
32 
   
Though the above quote relates specifically to landfill gas development, much of 
the quote could be applied to other sectors of renewable energy.  The lack of 
technological know-how remains a challenge for developing renewable energy 
generation on a mass scale.  As stated above, renewable energy is still in the early stages 
of development; most technology lacks local manufacturing bases and relies on imported   28
equipment. Further, much of renewable energy is generated in rural areas remote from 
main power grids. Difficulty remains in the technology and cost of transmitting such 
energy to the places of demand, such as urban and industrial centers. However, the 
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3.  Governmental Policies Concerning Fossil Fuels and Sources of Fossil Fuels 
 
Governmental Policies Concerning the Use of Non-Renewable Energy Resources 
 
  The Ninth and Tenth 5-Year Plans provide the basic governmental framework for 
China’s energy policies and future goals.  The Ninth 5-Year plan, drafted for the years 
1996-2000, had aimed to increase total energy output by 9% by 2000.  Under this plan 
significant expansion in fossil fuel development was encouraged.  Together with the 
expansion of fossil fuel usage was emphasis on technological improvements for energy 
efficiency and conservation of resources.  The Tenth 5-Year Plan focused on ensuring 
reliable energy resources sufficient for China’s economic growth.   Though both plans 
sought to further integrate renewable energy into viable energy resource alternatives, the 
policies which will be discussed in this section are those that directly relate to the usage 
of fossil fuels. 
 
  The energy aims concerning fossil fuels, and results, of the Ninth 5 Year Plan can 
be summarized as follows: 
1.  Increase total coal output to 1.4 billion tons by 2000.  Goal was met with a total 
coal consumption of 1.5 billion tons in late 2000, constituting 75 percent of the 
nation’s energy needs. 
2.  Boost proven reserves by by 33 billion bbl of crude oil and 17.7 tcf of natural gas, 
increase crude oil output to 3.1 million bbl per day and refinery output to 4.5 bbl 
per day, and increase natural gas production to 833 bcf.  By late 2000, 0.7 tcf of 
natural gas was produced and 3.6 million bbl of oil was consumed daily.
34      
 
 Overall, not every goal succeeded. Nonetheless, China managed to secure enough 
energy supply to support its economic growth.  It managed this through a variety of 
strategies.  It stabilized coal output in eastern China, Shanxi, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia. 
For oil and natural gas, it expanded the scope of operations to exploit offshore gas and oil 
simultaneous with domestic production.
35 The importance of listing these policies is to 
show that the Ninth 5-Year Plan constituted a significant expansion in China’s energy 
sector, and reflects the government’s desire to secure and exploit fossil fuel resources for 
its growing economy.  Such policies form the base for China’s future energy strategies, 
and help to discern possible fossil fuel forecasts.   
    29
  The energy policies of the Tenth 5-Year Plan reflect similar goals for expansion 
of fossil fuel resources as those implemented in the Ninth 5-Year Plan.  Central to 
securing enough resources for its growing economy   were the following strategies. First, 
China recognized the inevitability of expanded dependency on foreign resources of oil 
and sought to establish relations with oil producing nations (Southwest Asia, Middle East, 
Africa, Latin America, etc), while also using foreign capital and technology to develop 
energy resources (for example, Central Asia).   
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Second, it also expanded developing sources in Chinese territory ashore and at sea.  Third, 
efforts to develop the infrastructure in rail, river, and ocean transportation for the purpose 
of transporting petroleum products were implemented.  Finally, concerning relations with 
foreign oil resources, China has sought to gain exploration rights and production control 
over foreign energy fields.
36      
   
  In conclusion, the policies laid by both the Ninth 5-Year Plan and Tenth 5-Year 
Plan reflect an overall expansion in fossil fuel dependency.  Both plans acknowledge the 
continued reliance on coal as a major source of energy consumption and increasing 
reliance on foreign oil.  
     




  The predominant reason for China’s coal based energy system is China’s massive 
total coal reserve, which ranks second only to the former Soviet Union in the world.  Coal 
is therefore domestically available and under direct control of the government.  
Furthermore, despite recent massive layoffs in the coal mining industry, coal industries 
still employ a large portion of the country’s labor force.   
 
  Coal usage is inextricably tied to all sectors of China’s energy system.    
According to one study, in 1999 ‘about 39 percent of Chinese coal consumption was 
consumed in power stations, 14 percent for coking, 10 percent for domestic and 
residential use, 1 percent for rail and the rest by other industries such as chemical, cement, 
ceramics, and glass-making plants.’ Coal powers approximately three quarters of the 
electricity in China.
37 Hence, coal is likely to remain the major fossil fuel in China’s 




  By the early 1970s the China’s predominant reliance on coal was challenged by 
the growth of the oil sector.  Oil exports had increased steadily throughout the 1970s as 
China expanded domestic petroleum production; by the mid-1980s, however, oil 
production had peaked and by 1993 China became a net oil importer. Since most oil   30
statistics were covered in the section on foreign dependency, they will not be repeated 
here.   
 
Natural Gas  
 
  Natural gas offers some promise as an alternative source for China’s energy needs.  
Natural gas holds a number of attractive advantages; first, it would help to mitigate 
China’s over dependency on oil and fuel, second, it is cheaper than either coal or  
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oil, and finally, it is a relatively clean burning fuel- a vital characteristic considering 
China’s current environmental crisis.  Currently, the usage of natural gas is quite low, 
less than 3 percent.  Beijing is trying to boost natural gas to 8 to 10 percent of the energy 
consumption by 2020.  To achieve this China is seeking to exploit both domestic and 
foreign reserves.  It has also currently implementing a major construction effort for the 
necessary infrastructure needed to transport natural gas.  “Total gas reserves onshore as 
estimated at 38 tcm, with proved reserves both on- and offshore of 2.56 tcm in 2000, a 58 
percent increase over 1990 estimated reserves.”
38  In sum, if China undergoes the 
necessary infrastructural changes and secures domestic and international supplies, natural 
gas may offer an efficient an clean fossil fuel energy supply.     
 
4.  Forecast for Renewable Energy Growth and Fossil Fuel Usage 
 
  Two possible scenarios for China’s future energy situation are presented here.  
The first scenario is the ‘Renewable Energy Scenario,’ in which the supply and demand 
factors are conducive to green growth, leading to the best possible outcome for renewable 
energy use in China.  This scenario also presents the most likely minimal usage of fossil 
fuels.  The following causal diagram explains the drivers and their effects on renewable 
energy and fossil fuels.    
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Drivers and Outcomes 
 
In this scenario, economic growth creates a demand for governmental policies in 
investment for renewables. However, transformations of the economy, such as less 
emphasis on heavy industry and more on light industry, lead to lower energy 
consumption, which decreases the need for traditional energy sources; fossil fuels.  The 
outcome is a larger demand for renewables.  Environment degradation drives 
governmental policies for environmentally friendly policies, and foreign dependency on 
oil drive governmental policies to lower imports.  The result of these policies is to lower  
38Cole, Bernard 27-28 
 
 
the supply of fossil fuels, and increase the use of renewable energy.  Governmental  
policies also lead to technological improvements and efficiency of energy usage for both 
renewable and fossil fuels, increasing the usage of renewable energy and decreasing the 
reliance on fossil fuels. The same governmental policies that increased investment in 
renewables decreases reliance on fossil fuels, and the same policies that seek to limit 
imports and protect the environmental also decrease a reliance on fossil fuels.   
 
Renewable Energy and Fossil Fuels:  Some Possible Statistical Outcomes  
 
  In this scenario, China’s annual oil increases may be as low as 3.3% and 
consumption approximately as low as 400 Mtoe/yr. Oil imports may be as low as 200 
Mtoe/ye.  Natural gas usage is highest in this scenario since it is efficient and clean, and 
may represent up to 11% of final energy consumption.  Coal is still a significant 
contributor to China’s power capacity, and may represent about 38 percent of net new 
capacity between 1998 and 2020.
39  
 
  The government policies in this scenario include the implementation of all the 
goals stated by the government in ‘China’s Renewable Energy Law.’  Hence, the goal for 
China’s renewable energy to represent 15% of China’s energy capacity is met. If China 
reaches its potential with renewable energy, wind energy could reach 30 GW by 2020
40, 
photovoltaic power generation could reach 4-8 GW by 2020, biomass 10-15 GW by 2020, 
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Drivers and Outcomes 
 
In the fossil fuel energy scenario, economic growth drives the demand for 
government policies leading to an increase in fossil fuel usage. Economic transformations 
lead to higher energy consumption, which contributes to this trend.  Environmental 
warnings are not well heeded, leading to weak governmental policies for environmental 
protection.  This in turn decreases the reliance on renewable energy supply.  Similarly, 
China manages to secure foreign oil resources, and imports increase.  Governmental 
policies towards technological improvements and efficiency do not advance much above 
current levels, subsequently decreasing the expansion of renewable energy and increasing 
the reliance on fossil fuels.  All in all, fossil fuel usage rises dramatically, and renewable 
energy contributes to only a small percentage of China’s energy capacity.   
 
  In the fossil fuel energy scenario, China is able to meet the goals of the Tenth 5-
Year Plan for securing fossil fuel resources both domestically and internationally.  As a 
result, fossil usage expands significantly.  Annual increases in oil demand may reach as 
high as 4.6 per cent by 2020 making China the leading importer of oil in the Asia-pacific 
region of the world.  Oil consumption may reach as high as 520 Mtoe/yr and at least half 
to over half of this amount would be imported.  The government would fail to 
development the infrastructure for natural gas exploitation and transport, and the annual 
gas consumption would only be about 120 bcm, of which approximately 40 bcm/yr 
would be imports.  Coal would continue to play a dominant role in generating power 
capacity, about 65 percent.
42      
 
  In this scenario renewable energy will fail to reach potential levels to contribute to 
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4 to 5 percent by 2020.
43 Wind power may be less than 15 GW by 2020
44.  Other 




  Though it is not possible to predict exactly the outcome of China’s future energy 
plans, based on the analysis given in this paper it is likely that China’s energy situation 
will include much of both forecasts, renewable and fossil fuel.  There is a strong 
likelihood that China will take seriously both the goals of the Renewable Energy Plan and 
the Tenth 5-Year Plan on expanding fossil fuels.  This will be driven by China’s 
inescapable need for greater energy resources, both renewable and non-renewable, due to 
its growing economy.  On the other side, renewable energy growth is also likely to be 
taken seriously due to environmental and dependency on foreign oil concerns.  This is not 
to say, however, that all the goals stated in the Renewable Energy Plan will be 
implemented, or that the potentials stated in the Renewable Energy scenario will be 
reached.  Massive infrastructural developments, research and technological  
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improvements will be needed to reach these goals.  Simultaneously, given the current  
trend of China’s international relations with oil rich countries, it is likely that China will  
continue to attempt to secure oil resources.  In sum, the likely scenario is China’s 
endeavor to expand and secure energy resources on all fronts, renewable and non-
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